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The class and social structure of developing nations has undergone profound 
transformation in recent decades as each nation has incorporated into an increasingly 
integrated global production and financial system. National elites have experienced a 
new fractionation. Emergent transnationally-oriented elites grounded in globalized 
circuits of accumulation compete with older nationally-oriented elites grounded in more 
protected and often state-guided national and regional circuits. This essay focuses on 
structural analysis of the distinction between these two fractions of the elite and the 
implications for development. I suggest that nationally-oriented elites are often 
dependent on the social reproduction of at least a portion of the popular and working 
classes for the reproduction of their own status, and therefore on local development 
processes however so defined whereas transnationally-oriented elites are less dependent 
on such local social reproduction. The shift in dominant power relations from 
nationally- to transnationally-oriented elites is reflected in a concomitant shift to a 
discourse from one that defines development as national industrialization and expanded 
consumption to one that defines it in terms of global market integration. 
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My objective here is to offer as theoretical reflection a ‘big picture’, that is, a 
macrostructural perspective through which to approach the theme of elites and 
development. A genealogy of inquiry into global inequalities and development in the 
modern era is a study in the original and evolution of the critique of capitalism and the 
distinct social forces and class agents that this system generates. Hence, how we 
conceptualize the role of elites in development will be tied to how we analyze 
capitalism as a world system and more specifically how we analyze its distinct social 
forces and class agents. In a nutshell, I suggest that globalization represents a new epoch 
in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism distinguished by the rise of a globally-
integrated production and financial system, an emergent transnational capitalist class, 
and incipient transnational state apparatuses. Structural changes in the world economy 
associated with globalization have contributed to a new fractionation among elites in the 
former Third World between nationally-oriented and transnationally-oriented groups. 
These two overlapping yet often competing sets of elites pursued distinct development 
strategies in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries. The former sought to 
build national circuits of accumulation while the latter sought to integrate local circuits 
into new transnational circuits of accumulation. These contrasting strategies for 
development involved distinct sets of policies: the one, policies that would protect local 
agents from global competition; the other, policies that integrate local agents into 
emergent transnational circuits. 
My propositions on globalization and in particular on national and transnational 
fractions of the elite are grounded in distinct strategies of accumulation and depart from 
conventional wisdom, yet they grow out of a rich history of intellectual and political 
debate. The theme of the role elites play in development is as old, or older, than the 
concept of development itself. Early enlightenment and bourgeois thinkers saw rising 
middle and commercial classes from whence many of them came as the agents of 
progress and modernization. Sociologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
such as Compte, Spencer, and Weber, would develop these views into theoretical 
constructs. But as the middle classes of the early capitalist era achieved political power 
and became the new ruling groups, Marx and other nineteenth century radical thinkers 
critiqued the new order as generating the social conditions associated with 
underdevelopment. As Europe unleashed a new round of imperialist expansion in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a new generation of Marxists thinkers, 
from Hilferding to Lenin, Bukharin, and Luxemburg identified the leading capitalist 
states as the agents behind the colonization and plunder of what would later be called 
the Third World. Among this generation, Leon Trotsky developed perhaps the most 
coherent theoretical explanation for inequalities between rich and poor countries in his 
theory of combined and uneven development. 
In the wake of World War II and decolonization newly independent countries from 
Africa and Asia joined with their Latin American counterparts in shifting international 
political attention to global inequalities (see, inter-alia, Prashad 2007). How to account 
for this inequality and what to do about it became the focus of heated intellectual and 
ideological battles and formed the backdrop to the rise of development studies. United 
States president Harry Truman famously launched the ‘era of development’ in a 1949 
speech, declaring that ‘we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Esteva 1991: 7). Behind the Truman declaration was  
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the effort to open up the former colonial world to an expanding international capitalism. 
The story of the rise of modernization theory in the wake of the Truman declaration, 
largely in the US academy with ample support from the policymaking establishment, is 
now well known. The theme of enlightened elites leading societies into development 
and progress became a fundamental tenet of modernization and concomitant political 
development theories that dominated the social sciences from the 1950s into the 1970s. 
But alternative explanations for development and underdevelopment challenged the 
hegemony of modernization theory in the 1960s and on to the drumbeat of anti-colonial 
and revolutionary struggles across the Third World that challenged the very structures 
of the world capitalist system. From the perspective of new dependency, world-systems, 
and radical international political economy theories, elites in the Third World were 
largely seen as agents of a world capitalist system whose very constitution and 
reconstitution was founded on the unity and antagonism of core and peripheral or 
developed and underdeveloped regions of the world. 
My own theory of global capitalism shares much with this radical intellectual tradition 
in development studies but also diverges on several key counts. I see globalization as a 
qualitatively new epoch in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism, characterized 
above all by the rise of truly transnational capital and the integration (or re-articulation) 
of most countries in the world into a new global production and financial system. The 
leading strata among national capitalist classes in both the North and the South have 
experienced ongoing integration across borders into an emergent transnational capitalist 
class (TCC) and at whose apex is a transnational managerial elite. The nation-state, 
while it does not disappear or even become ‘less important’, is undergoing 
transformation. The institutional apparatus of national states has become increasingly 
entangled in transnational institutional webs that bring them together with inter- and 
transnational institutions into what can be conceived as incipient transnational state 
apparatuses. During the 1980s and 1990s capitalists and elites around the world became 
fractionated along new lines: nationally-oriented and transnationally-oriented. 
Transnational fractions of local elites in competition with nationally-oriented fractions 
vied for, and in many countries around the world won state power. They utilized that 
power to push capitalist globalization, to restructure national productive apparatuses and 
integrate them into the new global production and financial system. 
These are complex propositions that I have written about extensively elsewhere (see, in 
particular, Robinson 2003, 2004, 2008). Here I want to focus on the implications of this 
theory of global capitalism for elites and development. I want to suggest, in particular, 
that nationally-oriented elites who promoted developmentalist projects in the twentieth 
century often depended on the social reproduction of at least a portion of the popular 
and working classes for the reproduction of their own power and status, and therefore 
on local development processes, however so defined and however deficient. In 
distinction, transnationally-oriented elites who pushed restructuring and integration into 
global capitalism were less dependent on such local social reproduction. With the shift 
in elites came a shift in discourse from national industrialization and expanding internal 
markets to global market integration and macroeconomic, principally neo-liberal, 
policies that facilitated such integration. 
There is little consensus on the appropriate terminology for inter-state and global 
inequalities. Here I will use interchangeably First and Third World, developed and 
developing/underdeveloped, core and periphery, and North and South, although I find 
all these terms problematic. Also, how to conceive elites is a contentious matter in  
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political sociology that I cannot take up here. Suffice it to observe that much debate has 
centered on the relationship between classes and elites and whether or not these are 
commensurate analytical categories. By elites I refer to dominant political, 
socioeconomic and cultural strata, and in particular, to capitalists and landlords, along 
with top level managers and administrators of the state and other major social 
institutions and leadership positions in the political system. Capitalists are elites who 
own or manage means of production as capital. Elites who are not necessarily capitalists 
occupy key decision-making positions in institutions, whether in private corporations, 
the state, political parties or cultural industries. However, in my view the status of elites 
that are not capitalists proper is dependent on the reproduction of capital.  
2  Nation-state capitalism and the turn to globalization 
Diverse Fordist-Keynesian models of national corporate capitalism spread throughout 
the twentieth century from the cores of the world capitalist system to the former colonial 
domains in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These countries tended to pursue a 
multiclass development model along radical Keynesian lines, often referred to as 
developmentalist, populist, or corporatist. Developmentalist capitalism took on a form 
distinct from its First World New Deal and social democratic variants, often involving a 
much greater role for the state and the public sector, mass social mobilizations growing 
out of anti-colonial, anti-dictatorial, and national-liberation movements, and populist or 
corporatist political projects. Both First and Third World models were predicated on a 
redistributive logic and on incorporation of labour and other popular classes into 
national historical blocs. The legitimacy of elites in the Third World may have been 
even more closely tied to the logic of this redistribution and the social reproduction of 
popular classes than their counterparts in the First World. 
World capitalism developed in this period within the nation-state and through the inter-
state system. Nation-states were linked to each other through the international division 
of labour and through commercial and financial exchanges in an integrated international 
market regulated, at least in theory, by the Bretton Woods institutions. In this way the 
system provided for more insulated forms of national control over economic and social 
policy and greater autonomy in internal capitalist development, even as the international 
market disciplined countries into supporting the international rules of exchange rates 
and exchange and reproduced the world capitalist power structure. The world economy 
experienced a sustained period of growth in the quarter century after World War II – the 
so called ‘golden age’ of capitalism. But the illusion of prosperity burst with the world 
economic downturn that began in the 1970s and that threw national corporate capitalism 
into crisis. 
The social origins of this crisis was to be found in the relative strength that working and 
popular classes won worldwide in relation to capital after many decades of class and 
social struggles in both the First and the Third World. Organized labour, increased taxes 
on profits and income, state regulation, revolutions in the Third World and the 
explosion of social movements and counter-hegemonic cultural practices everywhere 
constricted private capital’s real or perceived capacity for accumulation. The expansion 
of collective rights, the institutionalization of Keynesian-Fordist class compromise, and 
the prevailing norms of a ‘moral economy’ that assumed capital and state reciprocities 
with labour and citizens and an ethnical obligation to minimal social reproduction – all  
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this burdened capital with social rigidities that had to be reversed for a new phase of 
capitalist growth. Capital and its political representatives and organic intellectuals in the 
core countries organized a broad offensive – economic, political, ideological, military – 
that was symbolically spearheaded by the Reagan-Thatcher alliance. Emerging 
transnational elites from the centers of power in the world system launched a global 
counterrevolution that would be as much political and economic as social, cultural, and 
ideological, and that was still being fought out in manifold arenas in the twenty-first 
century. 
In structural terms, this crisis was not merely cyclical. Cyclical crises eventually 
accumulate into more generalized crises involving social and political upheavals and 
ushering in periods of restructuring. Restructuring crises result in novel forms that 
replace historical patterns of capital accumulation and the institutional arrangements 
that facilitated them (see, inter-alia, Aglietta 1979; Kotz et al. 1994). The world 
capitalist crisis that began in the 1970s is generally identified as the turning point for 
globalization and in my view signaled the transition to a new transnational stage in the 
system. For much of the twentieth century First World Keynesian capitalism and Third 
World developmentalist capitalism shared two common features: state intervention in 
the economy and a redistributive logic. The crisis that began in the 1970s could not be 
resolved within the framework of these post-World War II social structures of 
accumulation. In the First World there was a progressive breakdown of the Keynesian-
Fordist welfare states and in the Third World developmentalist projects became 
exhausted as manifest above all in economic contraction and the debt crisis of the 
1980s. 
Globalization became a viable strategy as capitalists and state managers searched for 
new modes of accumulation. ‘Going global’ allowed capital to shake off the constraints 
that nation-state capitalism had placed on accumulation; to break free of the class 
compromises and concessions that had been imposed by working and popular classes 
and by national governments in the preceding epoch. The decision by the US 
government to abandon the fixed exchange rate system in 1973 effectively did away 
with the Bretton Woods system and, together with deregulation, opened the floodgate to 
transnational capital movement and the meteoric spread of transnational corporations 
(TNCs). Capital achieved a newfound global  mobility, or ability to operate across 
borders in new ways, which ushered in the era of global capitalism. The renewed power 
to discipline labour that this afforded transnational capital altered the worldwide 
correlation of class and social forces in its favour. What was international capital in the 
preceding epoch metamorphosized into transnational capital. 
Emerging global elites and transnational capitalists set about to dismantle the distinct 
models associated with national corporate capitalism and to construct a new global 
‘flexible’ regime of accumulation. In broad strokes, Keynesianism was replaced by 
monetarist policies, deregulation, and a ‘supply side’ approach that included regressive 
taxation and new incentives for capital. The Fordist class compromise was replaced by a 
new capital-labour relation based on deunionization, flexible workers and deregulated 
work conditions and the welfarist social contract was replaced by social austerity and 
the law of the market in social reproduction. More specifically, the prospects for capital 
to accumulate and make profits were restored during the 1980s and on and on by four 
key developments associated with capitalist globalization.  
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First was a new capital-labour relation based on the deregulation, informalization, and 
‘flexibilization’ of labour. Second was a new round of extensive and intensive 
expansion. Extensively, the system expanded through the reincorporation of major areas 
of the former Third and Second worlds into the world capitalist economy, so that by the 
1990s no region remained outside the system. Intensively, public and community 
spheres that formerly lay outside (or buffered from) the logic of market relations (profit 
making) were commodified and opened up to accumulation through privatization, state 
deregulation and reregulation, including the extension of intellectual property rights, 
and so on. Third, was the creation of a global legal and regulatory structure to facilitate 
what were emerging globalized circuits of accumulation, including the creation of the 
World Trade Organization. And fourth, was the imposition of the neo-liberal model on 
countries throughout the Third and the former Second worlds, involving structural 
adjustment programmes that created the conditions for the free operation of capital 
within and across borders and the harmonization of accumulation conditions worldwide. 
Through neo-liberalism the world has increasingly become a single unified field for 
global capitalism. Capital has come to achieve a newfound global mobility in a double 
sense, in that the material and the political obstacles to its unfettered movement around 
the world have dramatically come down. As capital became liberated from the nation-
state and assumed new power relative to labour with the onset of globalization, states 
shifted from reproducing Keynesian social structures of accumulation to servicing the 
general needs of the new patterns of global accumulation. 
3  A transnational production and financial system 
Since the 1970s, the emergence of globally mobile transnational capital increasingly 
divorced from specific countries has facilitated the globalization of production (I 
include services here); the fragmentation and decentralization of complex production 
processes, the worldwide dispersal of the different segments in these chains, and their 
functional integration into vast global chains of production and distribution. World 
production is thus reorganized into new transnational, or global, circuits of 
accumulation through which values move instantaneously. National economies have 
been reorganized and reinserted as component elements of this new global production 
and financial system (on the anatomy of this system, see inter-alia, Dicken 2003; 
McMichael 1996), which is a qualitatively distinct world economic structure from that 
of previous epochs, when each country had a distinct national economy linked 
externally to one another through trade and financial flows. This is a shift from 
international market integration to global productive integration. I have referred to this 
distinction elsewhere as between a world economy – in which nation-states are linked to 
each other via trade and financial flows – to a global economy – in which the production 
process itself becomes globally integrated (Robinson 2003, 2004). At the same time an 
integrated global financial system has replaced the national bank-dominated financial 
systems of the earlier period. Global financial flows since the 1980s are qualitatively 
different from the international financial flows of the earlier period. 
Globalization refers to a process characterized by relatively novel articulations of social 
power which were not available in earlier historic periods. The increasingly total 
mobility achieved by capital has allowed it to search out around the world the most 
favourable conditions for different phases of globalized production, including the 
cheapest labour, the most favourable institutional environment (e.g., low taxes) and  
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regulatory conditions (e.g., lax environment and labour laws), a stable social 
environment, and so on. Transnational capital is the hegemonic fraction of capital on a 
world scale in the sense that it imposes its direction on the global economy and it shapes 
the character of production and social life everywhere. Although real power and control 
still remains rigidly hierarchal and has actually become more concentrated under 
globalization, the actual organizational form of economic activity is characterized by 
decentralized webs of horizontally interlocked networks in distinction to the old 
centralized hierarchies based on vertical integration. The rise of the global economy has 
been founded on the phenomenal spread since the late 1970s of diverse new economic 
arrangements associated with the transition from the Fordist regime of accumulation to 
new post-Fordist flexible regimes. Subcontracting and outsourcing have become a basic 
organizational feature of economic activity worldwide. In the earlier epochs of 
capitalism firms tended to organize entire sequences of economic production, 
distribution, and service from within. The maquiladora, or offshore, factories that are 
the epitome of the ‘global assembly line’ are based on this type of subcontracting 
network, although the phenomenon has long since spread to just about all sectors of the 
world economy. 
Subcontracting and outsourcing, along with a host of other new economic arrangements 
have resulted in the creation of vast transnational production chains and complex webs 
of vertical and horizontal integration patterns across the globe. The concepts of flexible 
accumulation and network structure capture the organizational form of globalized 
circuits (on this network structure, see, in particular, Castells 2000). Global production 
and service chains or networks are global in character, in that accumulation is 
embedded in global markets, involves global enterprise organization and sets of global 
capital-labour relations, especially deregulated and casualized labour pools worldwide. 
Transnational capital, as organized into the giant TNCs, coordinates these vast chains, 
incorporating numerous agents and social groups into complex global networks. 
Competition in the new global economy dictates that firms must establish global as 
opposed to national or regional markets, and that other economic agents must move 
beyond local markets if they are to remain viable. 
4  Global capitalism and transnationally-oriented elites 
Epochal changes in the system of world capitalism have had transformative effects on 
the world as a whole and on each region integrated in or rearticulated, to the system. 
Earlier epochs of world capitalism have had major implications for each country and 
region of the former Third World, which have gone through successive waves of ever-
deeper integration into the system. With each new integration or reintegration there has 
been a corresponding fundamental change in social and class structures and the leading 
economic activities around which social classes and groups have exercised collective 
agency. The epoch of corporate capitalism that preceded globalization saw a deeper 
integration of Africa, Asia, and Latin America into world capitalism, including a major 
expansion of exports in most cases and the rise of new industrial, commercial, and 
financial elites and new middle and working classes. The groups came together in multi-
class populist and corporatist projects that sought development through import-
substitution industrialization and modernization. Each phase of historical change in the 
world capitalist system – builds on preceding ones and retains important elements from 
them. Global capitalism is now having a similar transformative effect on every country  
  7
and region of the world. Developing countries have been experiencing a transition to a 
new model of economy and society as they become reinserted into the emerging global 
stage of world capitalism. 
As transnational capital integrates the world into new globalized circuits of 
accumulation it has broken down national and regional autonomies, including the earlier 
pre-globalization models of capitalist development and the social forces that sustained 
these models. Through internal adjustment and rearticulation to the emerging global 
economy and society, local productive apparatuses and social structures in each region 
are transformed, and different regions acquire new profiles in the emerging global 
division of labour. Integration into the emergent global system is the causal structural 
dynamic that underlies the events we have witnessed in nations and regions all around 
the world over the past few decades. We want to pay particularly close attention to 
changes in the economic structure because they provide the material basis for related 
processes of change in practices and institutions, politics, class structure, and for inquiry 
into the theme of elites and development. 
The remolding of each national and regional economy creates an array of contradictions 
between the old and new forms of accumulation. What sets a region off from other parts 
of the global economy in much of the development literature is uneven geographic 
development and distinct participation in an international division of labour. I suggest, 
however, that more determinant (of causal priority) in conceptualizing regions within 
the larger unity of the emerging global economy and society than uneven accumulation, 
while still important, is the distinct configurations of social forces and of institutions 
that arise from these configurations. If we are to properly understand the role of local 
and regional economies and social and class structures they must be studied from the 
perspective of their point of insertion into global accumulation rather than their 
relationship to a particular national market or state structure. 
Transnational class formation in the developing countries is a major dimension of 
capitalist globalization. As global capitalism penetrates new spheres and subjects them 
to the logic of transnational accumulation, pre-globalization classes such as peasantries 
and artisans tend to disappear, replaced by new dominant and subordinate class groups 
linked to the global economy. We have generally seen in developing countries: the rise 
of new dominant groups and capitalist fractions tied to the global economy; the 
downward mobility – or proletarianization – of older middle classes and professional 
strata and the rise of new middle and professional strata; proletarianization of peasants 
and artisans and the rise of new urban and rural working classes linked to transnational 
production processes; the working class itself become flexibalized and informalized; the 
appearance of an expanding mass of supernumeraries or marginalized. A global 
working class has emerged that runs the factories, offices, and farms of the global 
economy, a stratified and heterogeneous class, to be sure, with numerous hierarchies 
and cleavages internal to it – gender, ethnicity, nationality, and so on. 
Here I want to focus on elites. The TCC is comprised of the owners and managers of the 
TNCs and the private transnational financial institutions that drive the global economy 
(Sklair 2002; Robinson 2004). The TCC is a class group grounded in global markets 
and circuits of accumulation. The globally-integrated production and financial system 
underscores the increasing interpenetration on multiple levels of capital in all parts of 
the world, organized around transnational capital and the giant TNCs. It is increasingly 
difficult to separate local circuits of production and distribution from the globalized  
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circuits that dictate the terms and patterns of accumulation worldwide, even when 
surface appearance gives the (misleading) impression that local capitals retain their 
autonomy. There are of course still local and national capitalists, and there will be for a 
long time to come. But they must ‘de-localize’ and link to transnational capital if they 
are to survive. Territorially restricted capital cannot compete with its transnationally 
mobile counterpart. As the global circuit of capital subsumes through numerous 
mechanisms and arrangements these local circuits, local capitalists who manage these 
circuits become swept up into the process of transnational class formation. 
I have been writing about this process of transnational class formation and the rise of a 
TCC since the late 1990s (inter-alia, Robinson 1996, 2003, 2004). The topic has become 
part of a collective research agenda and the empirical evidence demonstrating the 
transnationalization of leading capitalist groups is now considerable (for a sampling, 
see, Sklair 2002; Kentor 2005). With the rise of transnational production chains and 
circuits of accumulation, transnationally-oriented capitalists in each country shift their 
horizons from national markets to global markets. Different phases of production, as 
they become broken down into component phases that are detachable and dispersed 
around the world, can be doled out to distinct economic agents through chains of 
subcontracting, outsourcing, and other forms of association. These agents become 
integrated organically into new globalized circuits, so that they are ‘denationalized’, in 
the material if not the cultural sense, and become transnational agents. The vast 
multilayered networks of outsourcing, subcontracting, collaboration, and so on, 
increasingly link local and national agents to global networks and structures. The TCC 
has increasingly exhibited a global political action capacity and placed itself on the 
world scene as a coherent actor. In the same way as business groups organize to orient 
national policy planning groups and lobby national governments, transnational business 
groups have become a powerful lobby in many countries around the world pushing for a 
shift in state policies toward promotion of the group interests of those integrated into 
transnational circuits. 
The composition of capitalist classes and elites in developing countries is altered by 
capitalist globalization. The spread of transnational circuits of accumulation present 
elites in developing countries with new opportunities to pursue their class and group 
interests by reinserting local economic activity that they manage as segments of 
globalized circuits. Other groups whose reproduction was tied to domestic accumulation 
may lose out if they are unable to transnationalize their local activity. In my detailed 
case study on Central America (Robinson 2003) I have shown how local elites who 
previously strived to build up national circuits of accumulation were confronted from 
the 1980s and on with a situation in which these circuits were no longer viable and in 
which restructuring and integration into globalized circuits became a profitable option. 
Hence their class and group interests shifted from national development to participation 
in new global markets and production and service sequences. The restructuring and 
globalization of local production processes do bring about new opportunities for upward 
mobility among some sectors of the national population. But these benefits of global 
integration, as I shall argue below, do not constitute development in the traditional 
sense. As these processes have unfolded there have been ongoing struggles in recent 
decades between ascendant transnational and descendant national fractions of dominant 
groups and these struggles often form the backdrop to national political and ideological 
dynamics. Transnational fractions of local capitalist classes and bureaucratic elites vied 
for state power and in most countries won government in the 1980s and 1990s, or at 
least came to capture ‘commanding heights’ of state policymaking via key ministries  
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such as foreign, finance, and central banks. In many developing countries transnational 
fractions utilized local states to latch their countries on to the train of capitalist 
globalization. 
5  National and global accumulation and the State 
Here there is a contradictory logic between national and global accumulation. On the 
one side are the only national fractions of dominant groups whose interests lie in 
national accumulation and traditional national regulatory and protectionist mechanisms. 
On the other are transnational groups tied to new globalized circuits of accumulation. 
Their interests lie in an expanding global economy. There is a tension between nation-
centric class interests and those groups who develop new relationships linked to 
transnationalized accumulation. As conflicts arise between descending forms of national 
production and rising forms of globalized capital local and national struggles should be 
seen as simultaneously global and internal. Transnational fractions, as they have 
captured governments around the world, or come to positions in which they can 
influence and redirect state policies, have utilized national state apparatuses to advance 
globalization, pursue economic restructuring, and to dismantle the old nation-state 
social welfare and developmentalist projects. While pursuing the neo-liberal model at 
home they have also pursued world-wide market liberalization and projects of regional 
and global economic integration. They have promoted a supra-national infrastructure of 
the global economy. 
Transnationally-oriented capitalists and state managers in developing countries have 
pursued a switch from ‘inward oriented development’, or accumulation around national 
markets such as the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) models that 
predominated in many Third World regions in the middle part of the twentieth century, 
to ‘outward-oriented development’ involving export-promotion strategies and a deeper 
integration of national economies into the global economy. This switch involves the 
emergence of new economic activities and structures of production in each country and 
region integrating into the global economy (Robinson 2002; 2003). These new activities 
generally imply local participation in globalized circuits of accumulation, or in global 
production and service chains. As I have shown in great detail for Latin America 
(Robinson 2008), these activities include maquiladora assembly operations and other 
forms of transnational industrial subcontracting, transnational corporate agribusiness, 
transnational banking and other financial services, transnational services such as call 
centers, software production, data processing, tourism and leisure, and so forth, as well 
as, very importantly, the transnationalization of the retail sector, or what I call 
Walmartization, along with the supply systems that stock retail. The new dominant 
sectors of accumulation in the developing world are, in sum, increasingly integrated into 
global accumulation circuits in a myriad of ways. 
It is important to explore the relationship between transnationally-oriented capitalist and 
business groups and elites in the state and the political system. As new transnational 
circuits of accumulation became dominant there were powerful pressures on state 
managers to promote these circuits locally – that is, promoting an environment friendly 
to transnational capital. Elites found that the reproduction of their status becomes linked 
to the new global accumulation strategy. Restructuring gave an immanent class bias to 
agents of the external sector. These agents tended to fuse with political managers of the  
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neo-liberal state and in the latter decades of the twentieth century began to coalesce 
gradually, in a process checkered with contradictions and conflict, into a 
transnationalized fraction of the national elite that promote and manage new globalized 
circuits of accumulation. At the helm of transnational fractions of the elite we generally 
find a politicized leadership and a technocratic cadre steeped in neo-liberal ideology and 
economics and sharing a familiarity with the world of academic think tanks, world-class 
universities, and international financial institutions. 
What were developmentalist states in the earlier epoch became neo-liberal states under 
globalization. These neo-liberal national states have functioned to serve global (over 
local) capital accumulation, including a shift in the subsidies that states provide, away 
from social reproduction and from internal economic agents and towards transnational 
capital. These neo-liberal states have performed three essential services: (1) adopt fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies that assure macro-economic stability and the free 
movement of capital; (2) provide the basic infrastructure necessary for global economic 
activity (air and sea ports, communications networks, educational systems, etc.), and; 
(3) provide social order, that is, stability, which requires sustaining instruments of social 
control, coercive and ideological apparatuses. When transnational elites speak of 
‘governance’ they are referring to these functions and the capacity to fulfill them. 
However, there are other conditions that transnational capitalists and elites require for 
the functioning and reproduction of global capitalism. National states are ill equipped to 
organize a supranational unification of macroeconomic policies, create a unified field 
for transnational capital to operate, impose transnational trade regimes, supranational 
‘transparency’, and so forth. The construction of a supranational legal and regulator 
system for the global economy in recent years has been the task of sets of transnational 
institutions whose policy prescriptions and actions have been synchronized with those 
of neo-liberal national state that have been captured by local transnationally-oriented 
forces. There is a new transnational institutionality, a new transnational configuration of 
power, but this is a very incomplete, contradictory, and open-ended process. A TNS 
apparatus is not the same as a ‘global government’, which does not exist. Transnational 
institutions attempt to coordinate global capitalism and impose capitalist domination 
beyond national borders. We can conceptualize a TNS apparatus as a loose network 
comprised of inter- and supranational political and economic institutions together with 
national state apparatuses that have been penetrated and transformed by transnational 
forces, and has not yet (and may never) acquired any centralized form. The TNS played 
a key role in imposing the neo-liberal model on the old Third World and therefore in 
reinforcing a new capital-labour relation. The IMF, for example, by conditioning its 
lending on a deregulation and flexibilization of local labour markets, as it has often 
done, is imposing the new capital-labour relation on the particular country and in the 
process fundamentally transforming local labour markets and class and power relations. 
Transnational elites set about to penetrate and restructure national states, directly, 
through diverse political-diplomatic and other ties between national states and TNS 
apparatuses and functionaries, and indirectly, through the impositions of transnational 
capital via its institutional agents (IMF, World Bank, etc.) and the structural power that 
global capital exercises over nation-states. Local transnational nuclei, or pools, have 
liaised with the transnational elite as ‘in-country’ counterparts through a shared outlook 
and interest in new economic activities and through diverse external political, cultural, 
and ideological ties. These nuclei sought in recent decades to advance the transnational 
agenda by capturing key state apparatuses and ministries, by the hegemony they were  
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expected to achieve in civil society, and by the power they wielded through their 
preponderance in the local economy and the material and ideological resources accrued 
through external linkages. Hence it is not that nation-states become irrelevant or 
powerless vis-à-vis transnational capital and its global institutions. Rather, power as the 
ability to issue commands and have them obeyed, or more precisely, the ability to shape 
social structures, shifts from social groups and classes with interests in national 
accumulation to those whose interests lie in new global circuits of accumulation. 
Although they do not disappear, national states experience dramatic fracturing and 
restructuring. As globalization proceeds, internal social cohesion declines along with 
national economic integration. The neo-liberal state retains essential powers to facilitate 
globalization but it loses the ability to harmonize conflicting social interests within a 
country, to realize the historic function of sustaining the internal unity of nationally-
conceived social formation, and to achieve legitimacy. Unable to resolve the 
contradictory problems of legitimacy and capital accumulation, local states opt simply 
for abandoning whole sectors of national populations. In many instances, they no longer 
bothered to try to attain legitimacy among the marginalized and supernumeraries, who 
are isolated and contained in new ways, or subject to repressive social control measures 
(such as, e.g., the mass incarceration of African Americans in the United States or 
‘social cleansing’ in several Latin American countries). A fundamental contradiction in 
the global capitalist system is a globalizing economy within a nation-state based 
political system. A TNS apparatus is incipient and unable to regulate global capitalism 
or to ameliorate many of its crisis tendencies. 
Power did shift in many countries from nationally-oriented dominant groups to these 
emerging transnationally-oriented groups. However, the crisis that exploded in 2008 
with the collapse of the global financial system has exacerbated crises of legitimacy in 
many countries around the world and seriously undermined the ability of transnational 
elites to reproduce their authority. Global elites have been scrambling since the Asian 
crisis of 1997-8 to develop more effective transnational state apparatuses, or institutions 
and mechanisms that allow for transnational coordination and supervision. These efforts 
have intensified since the collapse of 2008. In March 2009, for instance, the Chinese 
government called for the creation of a new global reserve currency to replace the 
dominant dollar – a super-currency made up of a basket of national currencies and 
controlled by the IMF. 
6  From a geographical to a social conception of development 
As capitalism globalizes, the twenty-first century is witness to new forms of poverty and 
wealth, and new configurations of power and domination. Class, racial and gender 
inequalities have in many respects been aggravated by globalization and new social 
cleavages are emerging. One major new axis of inequality is between citizen and non-
citizen in the face of a massive upsurge in transnational migration and the increasing use 
around the world of ethnic immigrant labour pools. Yet the dominant discourse on 
global inequality and development is still territorial, that is, inequality among nations in 
a world system. In the dominant development discourse what ‘develops’ is a nation-
state. But global society appears to be increasingly stratified less along national and 
territorial lines than across transnational social and class lines (Cox 1987; Hoogvelt 
1997; Robinson 1998, 2002, 2003). Certain forms of conceptualizing the North-South  
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divide obscure our view of social hierarchies and inequalities across nations and 
regions. Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans in 2005, for instance, lifting the veil of 
race, class, poverty and inequality in the United States. The storm disproportionately 
devastated poor black communities who lacked the resources to take protection and 
whose Third World social conditions became apparent. A United Nations report 
released in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane observed that the infant mortality 
rate in the United States had been rising for the previous five years and was the same as 
for Malaysia, that black children were twice as likely as whites to die before their first 
birthday, and that blacks in Washington DC had a higher infant death rate than people in 
the Indian state of Kerala (UNDP 2005). 
Clearly we need to rethink the categories of North and South and, indeed, the very 
concept of development. A sociology of national development is no longer tenable. In 
earlier epochs core and periphery referred to specific territories and the populations that 
resided therein. The center-periphery division of labour created by modern colonialism 
reflected a particular spatial configuration in the law of uneven development which is 
becoming transformed by globalization. The transnational geographic dispersal of the 
full range of world production processes suggests that core and peripheral production 
activities are less geographically bounded than previously, while new financial circuits 
allow wealth to be moved around the world instantaneously through cyberspace just as 
easily as it is generated, so that exactly where wealth is produced becomes less 
important for the issue of development. 
While the global South is increasingly dispersed across the planet so too is the global 
North. Rapid economic growth in India and China have created hundreds of millions of 
new middle class consumers integrated into the global cornucopia even as it has thrown 
other hundreds of millions into destitution. Globalization fragments locally and 
integrates select strands of the population globally. The cohesive structures of nations 
and their civil societies disintegrates as populations become divided into ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ labour pools and as local economic expansion results in the advancement of 
some (delocalized) groups and deepening poverty for others. We find an affluent 
‘developed’ population, including a privileged sector among segmented labour markets 
linked to knowledge-intensive, professional and managerial activities and high 
consumption exists alongside a super-exploited secondary segment of flexibilized 
labour and a mass of supernumeraries constituting an ‘underdeveloped’ population 
within the same national borders. This social bifurcation seems to be a worldwide 
phenomenon, explained in part by the inability of national states to capture and redirect 
surpluses through interventionist mechanisms that were viable in the nation-state phase 
of capitalism. 
The great geographic core-periphery divide that gave rise to development studies is a 
product of the colonial and imperialist era in world capitalism and is gradually eroding, 
not because the periphery is ‘catching up’, but because of the shift from an international 
to a global division of labour and the tendency for a downward leveling of wages and 
the general conditions of labour. The international division of labour has gone through 
successive transformations in the history of world capitalism. For many, the most recent 
permutation involves the shift in manufacturing from North to South, so that in the ‘new 
international division of labor’ (Frobel et al. 1980) the North specializes in high-skilled 
and better-paid labour supplying advanced services and technology to the world market 
while the South provides low-skilled and less paid labour for global manufacturing and  
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primary commodity supply. But this analysis, as Freeman observes, has become 
increasingly obsolete 
due to the massive investments that the large populous developing countries are 
making in human capital. China and India are producing millions of college 
graduates capable of doing the same work as the college graduates of the United 
States, Japan or Europe – at much lower pay…. The huge number of highly 
educated workers in India and China threatens to undo the traditional pattern of 
trade between advanced and less developed countries. Historically, advanced 
countries have innovated high-tech products that require high-wage educated 
workers and extensive R&D, while developing countries specialize in old 
manufacturing products. The reason for this was that the advanced countries had a 
near monopoly on scientists and engineers and other highly educated workers. As 
China, India and other developing countries have increased their number of 
university graduates, this monopoly on high-tech innovative capacity has 
diminished. Today, most major multinationals have R&D centers in China or India, 
so that the locus of technological advance may shift (2005:3). 
There remain very real regional distinctions in the form of productive participation in 
the global economy. But processes of uneven accumulation increasingly unfold in 
accordance with a social and not a national logic. Different levels of social development 
adhere from the very sites of social productive activity, that is, from social, not 
geographic, space. Moreover, privileged groups have an increasing ability to manipulate 
space so as to create enclaves and insulate themselves through novel mechanisms of 
social control and new technologies for the built environment. The persistence, and in 
fact growth, of the North-South divide remains important for its theoretical and practical 
political implications. What is up for debate is whether the divide is something innate to 
world capitalism or a particular spatial configuration of uneven capitalist development 
during a particular historic phase of world capitalism, and whether tendencies towards 
the self-reproduction of this configuration are increasingly offset by countertendencies 
emanating from the nature and dynamic of global capital accumulation. 
To explain the movement of values between different ‘nodes’ in globalized production, 
clearly we need to move beyond nation-state centric approaches and apply a theory of 
value to transformations in world spatial and institutional structures (the nation-state 
being the central spatial and institutional structure in the hitherto history of world 
capitalism). The notion of net social gain or loss used by development economists has 
little meaning if measured, as it traditionally is, in national terms, or even in geographic 
terms. The distribution of social costs and gains must be conceived in transnational 
social terms, not in terms of the nation-state vis-à-vis the world economy, but 
transnationally as social groups vis-à-vis other social groups in a global society. 
Development should be reconceived not has a national phenomenon, in which what 
‘develops’ is a nation, but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and intermediate 
population groups occupying contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational 
environment.  
7  Conclusions: elites, development, and social reproduction in the globalization 
age  
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Under the emergent global social structure of accumulation the social reproduction of 
labour in each country becomes less important for accumulation as the output of each 
nation and region is exported to the global level. The transnational model of 
accumulation being implemented since the 1980s does not require an inclusionary social 
base and is inherently polarizing. Socioeconomic exclusion is immanent to the model 
since accumulation does not depend on a domestic market or internal social 
reproduction. To phrase it another way, there is a contradiction between the class 
function of the neo-liberal states and their legitimation function. For neo-liberal elites, 
successful integration into the global economy became predicated on the erosion of 
labour’s income, the withdrawal of the social wage, the transfer of the costs of social 
reproduction from the public sector to individual families, a weakening of trade unions 
and workers movements, and the suppression of popular political demands. Hence, in 
the logic of global capitalism, the cheapening of labour and its social 
disenfranchisement by the neo-liberal state became conditions for ‘development’. The 
very drive by local elites to create conditions to attract transnational capital has been 
what thrusts majorities into poverty and inequality. 
At the core of what seemed to be an emerging global social structures of accumulation 
was a new deregulated capital-labour relation based on the casualization of labour 
associated with post-Fordist flexible accumulation, new systems of labour control and 
diverse contingent categories of labour. Workers in the global economy were 
themselves under these flexible arrangements increasingly treated as a subcontracted 
component rather than a fixture internal to employer organizations. In the Keynesian-
Fordist order, the labour supply and the work force needed to be stable, which lent itself 
to more regulated and protected capital-labour relations, whereas in global capitalism 
labour is reduced to an input just as any other, meaning that it needs to be totally 
flexible, available in large numbers that can be tapped, added to the mix, shifted, and 
dispensed with at will. Labour is increasingly only a naked commodity, no longer 
embedded in relations of reciprocity rooted in social and political communities that 
were historically institutionalized in nation-states. 
The decline of ISI industries and domestic market enterprises disorganized and reduced 
the old working class that tended to labour under Fordist arrangements, including 
unionization and corporatist relations with the state and employers. This fractionation 
often has political implications, as the declining group is more likely to belong to trade 
unions, to be influenced by a corporatist legacy, and to agitate for the preservation or 
restoration of the old labour regime and its benefits. It is also more likely to be male. 
The new workers faced a flexible and informalized labour regime. In many developing 
countries there has been a contraction of middle classes and professional strata that had 
developed through public sector employment and government civil service in the face of 
the dismantling of public sectors, privatizations, and the downsizing of states. At the 
same time, restructuring involves the rise of new middle and professional strata who 
may have the opportunity to participate in global consumption patterns, frequent 
modern shopping malls, communicate through cells phones, visit internet cafes, and so 
on. These strata may form a social base for neo-liberal regimes and become 
incorporated into the global capitalist bloc. 
Added to income polarization is the dramatic deterioration in social conditions as a 
result of austerity measures that have drastically reduced and privatized health, 
education, and other social programmes. Popular classes whose social reproduction is 
dependent on a social wage (public sector) have faced a social crisis, while privileged  
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middle and upper classes become exclusive consumers of social services channeled 
through private networks. Here we see the need to reconceive development in 
transnational social rather than geographic terms. The pattern under globalization is not 
merely ‘growth without redistribution’ but the simultaneous growth of wealth and of 
poverty as two sides of the same coin. Global capitalism generates downward mobility 
for most at the same time that it opens up new opportunities for some middle class and 
professional strata as the redistributive role of the nation-state recedes and global market 
forces become less mediated by state structures as they mold the prospects for 
downward and upward mobility. 
In conclusion, the first few decades of globalization involved a change in the correlation 
of class forces worldwide away from nationally-organized popular classes and towards 
the transnational capitalist class and local economic and political elites tied to 
transnational capital. The elimination of the domestic market as a strategic factor in 
accumulation had important implications for class relations, social movements, and the 
struggle over development. By removing the domestic market and popular class 
consumption from the accumulation imperative, restructuring helped bring about the 
demise of the populist class alliances between broad majorities and nationally-based 
ruling classes that characterized the pre-globalization model of accumulation. Later on, 
popular classes – themselves caught up in a process of reconfiguration and 
transnationalization – stepped up their resistance and the hegemony of the transnational 
elite began to crack. The crisis that hit the global economy in 2008 with the collapse of 
the financial system had been building for some time and is rooted in the structural 
contradictions of global capitalism alluded to here. 
Stepping back in perspective, the problematic of development in the South is ultimately 
the same as that of social polarization and overaccumulation in the global economy as a 
whole. Sustaining dynamic capitalist growth, beyond reining in global financial markets 
and shifting from speculative to productive investment, would require a redistribution of 
income and wealth to generate an expanding demand of the popular majority. This is a 
very old problem that has been debated for decades: how to create effective demand that 
could fuel capitalist growth. The ISI model was unable to achieve this on the basis of 
protected national and regional markets; the neo-liberal model has been unable to 
achieve this on the basis of insertion into global markets. 
Seen from the logic of global capitalism the problem leads to political quagmire: how to 
bring about a renewed redistributive component without affecting the class interests of 
the dominant groups, or how to do so through the political apparatuses of national states 
whose direct power has diminished considerably relative to the structural power of 
transnational capital. This is a dilemma for the global system as a whole. The pressures 
to bring about a shift in the structure of distribution – both of income and of property – 
and the need for a more interventionist state to bring this about, is one side of the 
equation in the constellation of social and political forces that seemed to be coming 
together in the early twenty-first century to contest the neo-liberal order. Political, 
economic, and academic elites began to look for alternative formulas to address the 
global economic crisis and at the same time to prevent – or at least better manage – 
social and political unrest. In my own view, the struggle for development is a struggle 
for social justice and must involve a measure of transnational social governance over 
the process of global production and reproduction as the first step in effecting a radical 
worldwide redistribution of wealth and power downward to poor majorities.  
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